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VI
APPORTIONMENT PROBLEMS
The separate property of a spouse includes all property "owned
or claimed" at the start of the community. The determination of the
ownership of property presents no problem peculiar to community
property. What, however, is property "claimed" by a spouse? Does
a right to property have to exist? The answer to these questions may
be found in various situations:
A. Wages
Where the services have been performed before the start of the
community but payment has not been made, such wages are "claimed"
by the spouse rendering the service and constitute separate property
of that spouse when paid.' Whether the spouse is on a cash or accrual
method of accounting for income tax purposes is immaterial. The
question is what is treated as separate property and as community
property under the Pennsylvania Act.
Wages should be apportioned on a per diem basis. For example,
if payment was made on September 15 for work done during the
preceding thirty days one-half of the amount received would be sepa-
rate income and .one-half community income. If the work is done under
an agreement whereby compensation is to be fixed when the work is
completed, the amount which would have been payable at the start of
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1. Asher v. Welch, D. C. S. D. Cal., 39-1 USTC Par. 9279 (1938) ; Houston v.
Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 188, I. T. 3792 (1934), 1946-1 C. B. 86; cf. Fooshe v. Com-
missioner, 132 F. 2d 686 (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has ruled that a husband and wife who
are domiciled in the State of Pennsylvania are entitled to include in their separate
federal income tax returns "one-half of their community income received and accrued
on and after September 1, 1947 . . ." Supra, part I, note 16. The word "received" in
the ruling does not indicate that all income received after September 1, 1947, is com-
munity income. The ruling stated that "community income" received after that date
will be taxable one-half to the husband and one-half to the wife.
(188)
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the community if the work had then ceased would be separate income.
The amount should be determined under the principles applied in ac-
tions for quantum meruit.2 This rule has been applied to determine
what part of executors' commissions allowed after the death of the
executor were includible in the gross estate for the purposes of the
federal estate tax.3
If the wages have been paid in advance, it can be said that the
total amount paid as such wages is owned by the recipient when the
amount is paid. On this basis amounts so paid are taxed when re-
ceived.4 However, for the purpose of the Community Property Act,
it seems that if the recipient of the wages would be under a duty to
refund a part of them were he to cease work on September 1, it could
be said that the part of the wages applicable to the period after that
date would constitute community income even though received before
the effective date of the Act.
B. Contingent Fees
If the start of the community takes place after the making of a
contingent fee contract but before payment thereunder becomes due,
the nature of the payment as community property is to be determined
at the time the contingency materializes. Until then, there is clearly
no right, present or deferred, in the obligee of such a contract. Such,
in effect, was the holding in Land v. Acadian Production Corporation
of Louisiana.5 The husband performed legal services on a contingent
fee basis before the dissolution of the community by a separation. The
payment on the contingent fee contract was in the form of a mineral
lease, the title to which did not vest in the husband until after the
dissolution of the community. The court held that only upon the
settlement of the action involved was the husband "entitled to full
recovery under his contract" and that, being entitled to payment after
dissolution of the community, the property in question was separate
property.6
2. 5 WILLISTox, CONTRACTS § 1459 (Rev. ed.) ; 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, 347
(1932).
3. McGlue, 41 B. T. A. 1199 (1940); Estate of Robinson, B. T. A. Memo. Op.
C. C. H. DEC. 12,253 (A).
4. MAGILL, TAXABLE INco E 200 (1945).
5. 57 F. Supp. 338 (D. C. W. D. La. 1944).
6. In Land v. Acadian Production Corporation of Louisiana, supra, the court
states at p. 349, "the only case holding that the time of entering the land fixes its status
as community or separate property is Crochet v. McCamant, 40 So. 474 (La.)
It is now formally overruled." The court is inaccurate here. There is another
Louisiana case which holds to a relation back theory on even thinner grounds than
the Crochet case. It is Barbet v. Langlois, 5. La. Ann. 212 (1850). There the hus-
band, before marriage, by reason of his ownership of certain riparian lands, held, under
a statute, the power to purchase the lands in question exclusive of other purchasers
for a certain period. His marriage preceded the exercise of this power. The court
held that though the legal title vested in him after marriage, the right arose before
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An opposite result was reached in. Commissioner v. King.7 In
that case the husband entered into a contract for legal services on a
contingent fee basis. After a portion of the work on this contract had
been done, but before the suit upon which the fee was contingent had
been settled, the wife died. The Board of Tax Appeals ' held that the
fee was community property, one-half of which belonged to wife's
estate. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Board, saying that the
fee was community property because the basis of the husband's right
to the fee was the agreement entered into while the marriage relation
existed, the husband's right to the fee being referable to its origin in
that contract. The court said that "Texas decisions are to the effect
that where property is acquired as a result of compliance with the
terms of a contract, the question whether, within the meaning of'the
above set out statute (concerning the presumption that property ac-
quired during marriage is community property), it is or is not
acquired during marriage, depends upon the status existing at the
time the contract was entered into; the property being the separate
property of the spouse who was a party to such contract if that contract
was entered into prior to marriage though the performance under the
contract was not completed, and a right to the property was not fixed
or consummated until after the marriage. .. " Although the court
states the general rule that rights arising during marriage will take
their character as community or separate property from the status
at the inception of the right, and, if they are based on contract, from
the status at the time of the inception of the contract, the rule in Texas
is not settled. The principal cases involve contracts for the sale of
land. Many of them concern land grants and it is often not possible
to decide from the cases whether an actual right to the grant has
arisen. All of the other cases involve a present enforceable right in
one spouse at the time of marriage.9 The decision in Commissioner v.
marriage and the lands were his separate property. Of course, if what the court said
had been the case, the result would doubtless have been correct. But it is clear that
the husband in the Barbet case had no right at the time of his marriage. He had a
power in the nature of a temporary exclusive option. At the moment of his marriage
he held no right or claim against the government, for he had not exercised this power.
The right arose when he exercised the power to create a right in himself and a cor-
relative duty in the government. At least as to the federal courts, in any case, the
overruling in the Land case of the Crochet case would seem to put the Barbet case
in a dubious light.
7. 69 F. 2d 639 (C. C. A. 5th 1934).
8. 26 B. T. A. 1158 (1932).
9. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S. W. 281 (1898) seems to be the earliest
Texas case to examine the authorities and the basis for the rule in the Spanish law.
The contract in question in this case involved a concession made to the parties by the
government by which, in consideration of their stipulating to introduce colonists into
the state, they were given the right to a premium in lands, to be selected and granted
to them upon their compliance with the agreement. Before he married, a man holding
such a contract had introduced some colonists. In 1832 he was married and there-
after, more colonists were introduced. In 1834 lands were set apart for his use. The
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King, supra, is, therefore, not supported by the local Texas property
rules.
facts do not indicate whether or not, at the time of his marriage in 1832, this indi-
vidual had a right to demand anything. The court held the property to be separate
property of the husband.
The court in the Welder case decides from this that choses in action held by
either of the spouses before marriage remain the separate property of such spouse.
Perhaps this means presently enforceable choses in action. But the court, without
citing further authority, goes on to state the rule more broadly: "If the contracts be
property, and if all property held by either the husband or wife at the time of the
marriage be separate property of the consort who held it, it . . . did not fall into
the community."
The court then turned to a consideration of the Louisiana authorities. Barbet v.
Langlois, discussed supra, was cited.
In re Moseman's Estate, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886), held that the proceeds of an
insurance policy purchased by husband before marriage were separate property
chargeable, in favor of the community, with premiums which had been paid after mar-
riage with community funds. The court said that on the date the policies were ac-
quired Moseman had a right to receive, at his death, the sums to be paid subject to
his payment of premiums. If the contract of insurance provided for the insurance of
Moseman's life from the date it was entered into, as it very likely did, then the court's
analysis is correct. It is perhaps more accurate to say that Moseman has a power, by
paying premiums, to create a right in his estate and a duty on the company to pay the
benefit, or that he has a right to the benefits subject to the condition subsequent of
the payment of premiums. But the court states the general rule more broadly: "When
the condition is accomplished it refers back to the time of the making of the contract."
Does this refer to a condition precedent as well as condition subsequent?
The court in the Welder case seems to think so and returns to the Texas authori-
ties, citing Mills v. Brown, 69 Tex. 244, 6 S. W. 612 (1887), as a decision not in point
but in harmony with this idea. But in Mills v. Brown the facts and holding rather
indicate the opposite conclusion, if they are at all in point. For there an unmarried
woman made a survey and paid surveyor's fees on certain land which could be acquired
by patent from the government by settling thereon and survey. After her marriage
she and her husband settled the land and subsequently the patent was issued. The
land was held to be community property. At the time of her marriage the wife clearly
had no right to the land-this could inure only by settlement. But what happened
to the doctrine of relation back to the origin of the title? Was settlement not a condi-
tion ?
In Manchaca v. Field, 62 Tex. 135 (1884), still another test is put forth. This
case also involved settlement-upon public lands for which husband had a concession
during marriage and performed conditions requisite to securing title after marriage
dissolved by death. The court said that the concession, having a money value and
being the subject of sale was property, ergo wife had an interest in it though condi-
tion leading to title was performed after wife's death.
One case seems to base its holdings on the simple issue as to whether, at the time of
marriage, the spouse had a right or merely a power or privilege. Webb v. Webb, 15
Tex. 274 (1855). The husband "selected" certain land under a public land grant during
marriage and got title after the death of his wife. The land was held separate property,
and the court said, "the statement of facts shows conclusively that title to the land
was not obtained until after the dissolution of the matrimonial relations by the death
of the wife. Does it show that anything had been done, before this dissolution, giving
a right it; law, to demand the title that subsequently issued in favor of the husband,
on which an equity could be raised . . .?" (italics added).
This case was distinguished and impliedly overruled by the court in Manchaca v.
Field, supra, and likewise in the Welder case.
The next Texas case was Creamer v. Briscoe, 107 S. W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908). There, the husband and wife settled on land and did everything necessary to
get the homestead donation except, during the three years of required residence, the
wife died. The court held the property was community property. Here we have
everything fulfilled and a present right subject to a condition subsequent.
Stiles v. Hawkins, 207 S. W. 89 (Tex. App. 1918) held that the land was sepa-
rate property where the settlers on it made survey but no payments for public
land, and then conveyed to an unmarried man who, after his marriage made payments
and took title. Most all of the preceding cases are cited whether they are actually in
point or not.
Bishop v. Williams, 223 S. W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Jackson v. Jackson,
258 S. W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); and Evans v. Ingram. 288 S. W. 494 (Tex.
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The theory of the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in Estate
of Crail ' is contrary to the theory of Commissioner v. King. The
Board in that case held that the gross estate of the decedent did not
include a contingent fee which was paid after death where the con-
tingency upon which it was paid occurred after death.
C. Bonuses
If a bonus is paid after September 1 for work done during the
year 1947 under a plan which was in existence throughout the entire
year, the amount of the bonus should be apportioned between separate
and community property. It can be argued that no "right" to any
amount exists until the end of the year and hence the entire bonus is
community property. Wrightsman v. Commissioner," however, com-
pels a different conclusion. In that case the taxpayer was president
and manager of a corporation and worked throughout the year with
an understanding that he would be compensated at the end of the
year in proportion to the corporation's profits. On December 24, 1936
the taxpayer and his wife moved to Texas. On December 30, 1936 the
board of directors fixed his salary for 1936. The court held that he
had acquired his salary not when it was voted by the board of directors
but when "he went about performing the duty and rendering the
services he had agreed to perform and render." 12 The court did not
adopt the relation back theory of Commissioner v. King, supra. If it
had it could have decided the case merely by saying that the contract
was entered into while the taxpayer was a resident of a non-community
property state; therefore, the entire amount which he was- paid con-
stituted separate property. The court, however, allowed an apportion-
Civ. App. 1926), all concern contracts for the purchase of land entered into by a hus-
band before marriage. As stated before, the doctrine of equitable conversion removes
these cases from the general problem. Due to this fiction it must be conceded that if
a contract for the sale of land exists before marriage, the land is separate property.
But does such a way of putting the rule add anything to the simple rule that if the
spouse has, at time of marriage, an enforceable right or a right divestible only upon
failure of a condition subsequent, the property will be separate property?
The court, in Commissioner v. King, however, also mentions, in order to dis-
tinguish them, several cases involving adverse possession. In attempting to distinguish
the adverse possession cases from the general rule, the court in the King case, supra,
said, "It appears from the opinions in the just cited cases that the reason for such
classification is that prior to the expiration of the period of adverse possession required
to confer title, the possessor has no right whatever to the land adversely possessed.
The last cited cases (adverse possession cases) are readily distinguishable from the
instant one, in that, while the marriage relation existed, respondent, in pursuance of
the contingent fee agreement, was performing services in the suit for which he was
entitled to be paid in the event of his being successful in the suit." There seems to
be no difference. It might more accurately be said that the husband in the King case
was, during marriage, performing service for which he was entitled to be compen-
sated only if the suit was won and that the adverse possessors in those cases were
doing something for. which they were entitled to land only if the possession fulfilled
the prescriptive period.
10. 46 B. T. A. 658 (1942).
11. 111 F. 2d 227 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
12. Id. at 229.
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ment between the time when the taxpayer was living in a non-com-
munity property state and the time when he lived in a community
property state. The method to be used in apportioning the bonus
should depend upon the method of calculating the bonus under
the plan. For example, if the bonus is a fixed amount based upon
earnings it could be apportioned, based upon earnings up to September
1 and earnings after that date. Another method of apportionment
would be on a daily basis. It would seem that the daily basis should
be used only in those cases where an apportionment cannot be made
based upon the plan itself.
Would apportionment be required in the case of a bonus which
was paid without any obligation on the part of an employer? For
example, if without any plan or arrangement the board of directors
meets and pays a bonus to the employees after September 1 for the
year 1947, can it be said that such a bonus was owned or claimed on
September 1, 1947? Wrightsman v. Commissioner, supra, is not con-
trolling because in that case the work was done under an agreement
whereby the salary was to be paid at the end of the year. Since in
the assumed facts no such agreement exists, the theory which should
be adopted is the same as was adopted by the Board of Tax Appeals
in United States Trust Company of New York "8 in dealing with
the inclusion in the gross estate of wages paid gratuitously after death.
In that case it was held that wages paid as a matter of grace after
the death of the employee were. not property to be included in his
gross estate; no part of the wages was owned at the date of death.
D. Dividends
If the date of declaration and the record date precede the start
of the community, the dividend would be separate property. Such
a dividend is clearly "owned or claimed" at the start of the community.
For federal income tax purposes a dividend is taxable to tax-
payers either on the cash or accrual method of accounting when the
dividend is actually paid.14 The federal income tax rule, however, is
based on a Treasury regulation of long standing, the ease of checking
tax returns, and the technical provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
relating to the taxability of dividends; the basis for the rule clearly
shows that it would have no effect on a decision as to when a dividend
is "owned or claimed".
Will a dividend be separate property if it is declared before the
start of the community with the record date after that time? Generally
13. 9 B. T. A. 514 (1947).
14. Tar Products Corporation v. Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 866 (C. C. A. 3rd
1942) ; American Light and Traction Company, 156 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
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a dividend becomes a debt when it is declared. 5 Therefore, a dividend
would be "owned or claimed" when the stockholder became a creditor
of the corporation and all dividends declared before the start of the
' community would be separate property.
What rule should apply to extraordinary dividends and stock
dividends paid after September 1, 1947 which represent a distribution
or capitalization of surplus acquired by the corporation before Sep-
tember 1, 1947? In Pennsylvania the doctrine of intact value has been
applied by the courts in many cases."6 These cases are based upon
the fact that the property which the stockholder has is an interest in
the capital and surplus of the corporation on a particular date and that
the property should be maintained intact. As we have pointed out
under "Meaning of Income", income under the Community Property
Act is common law income and all other receipts are capital.' 7 Thus,
the "intact value" rule should be used to determine the part of the
receipt that was separate property and the part that was community
property. The intact value of the property at the start of the com-
munity or when acquired by gift or devise would have to be main-
tained.:'
E. Interest
It has long been held that interest accrues from day to day. 9
Although not payable until a specified date, the right to interest is in
existence as it accrues. The fixing of a date upon which the payment
shall be due is an agreement on the part of the obligee of the interest,
for the sake of practical business, to refrain from demanding the inter-
est until a certain date. His right, however, exists.20 Therefore,
interest should be apportioned on a day-to-day basis with respect to
interest accruing before the start of the community and that accruing
after such time.2
15. 11 FLETCHERt, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRATioNs c. 58, §5322 (1932).
16. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
17. Supra, part I, p. 26,
18. In the case of stock dividends, it may be said that the spouse owning the stock-
on September 1, 1947, was entitled to the whole dividend. Such was the conclusion of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Schofield v. Weiss, 131 F. 2d 631
(1942), in which the court applied the Texas law. For the reasons given under
"Meaning of Income" a different result would probably be reached in Pennsylvania.
19. Davidson's Estate, 287 Pa. 354 (1926), held that interest is apportionable be-
cause presumed to accrue from day to day, regardless of whether payable at fixed
periods, and awarded interest accrued before the death of a life tenant but paid after
death to the estate of the life tenant.
20. As to rule in bankruptcy see Adams v. Napa Cantina Wineries, 94 F. 2d 694
(C. C. A. 9th 1938).
21. To the same effect for purposes of federal estate tax, Maass v. Higgins, 312
U. S. 443 (1941).
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F. Growing Crops
In Texas crops grown on separate property during coverture are
treated as income and therefore as community property rather than
being treated as an "increase" of separate property and therefore sepa-
rate property. 22 The Texas cases base their opinions on the fact that
the crops were grown through the joint industry and effort of the
spouses.23
However, another rule must be considered. When land is con-
veyed upon which there are growing crops, the crops pass with the
land, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, which is to say
that they are, while growing, considered real property. From this, by
analogy, it might be said that if the start of the community takes place
while crops are growing they retain their identity as separate property.
On the other hand, it may be said that since such crops are in the nature
of income acquired during coverture they are community property.
At the start of the community the growing crops are analogous to an
unmatured right, and the holder of the land could not realize upon
their value because they were unripe and of little or no value if severed
at that time. The crops acquired their real value as they matured
after coverture and they, therefore, partake of the community property
character. Crops standing ripe and ready for harvest at the time of the
effective date would pose a more difficult question. Such crops, it can
be said, constitute separate property by analogy to the rule applicable
to earnings.
G. Trust income
In the case of income from a distributable trust, the income should
be accrued to September 1 on the basis of the rule applicable in cases
of apportionment between successive life estates. It would seem that the
property owned or claimed by the life tenant on September 1, will be the
property which his estate would receive if he had died on that date.
Thus, the rules for apportionment between successive life tenants would
apply and under those rules income would be apportioned as follows:
(a) dividends which were of record prior to the start of the community
would be separate property; 24 (b) interest would be apportioned on a
22. Hanks v. Leslie, 159 S. W. 1056 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
23. Krause v. Kessler, 112 S. W. 2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
24. Principal and Income Act of 1947 (Act No. 516), § 4 and § 5 (6). Here the
problem is one of apportionment, rather than allocation, and hence there would seem
to be no reason why the rules laid down in the Principal and Income Act should not
be applied. The objection to applying the Act to communty property allocation prob-
lems are discussed at 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 25 (1947).
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day-to-day basis,25 and (c) rent would also be apportioned on a day-
to-day basis."
As to income from a discretionary trust collected before September
1 but distributed in the discretion of the trustees after September 1,
such income would be community income. Where the beneficiary can
in no wise participate in the decision as to the time of distribution of
the income, it cannot be said that the beneficiary owned or claimed any
of the income on September 1. If the beneficiary were the sole trustee,
then it might be said that all of the income was separate income. If the
beneficiary were one of several trustees, then such income should not
be separate income but community income. The foregoing applies
to those trusts where the beneficiary is not entitled to the income at
all events. For example, there are discretionary trusts where the
beneficiary would be entitled to the accumulated income if he died at
any particular time. In such cases the income which had been collected
but not distributed by September 1 should constitute the separate in-
come of the beneficiary when distributed. Problems of allocation would
arise; unless the income distributed can be identified, the rule of first
in, first out should apply.
In the case of an estate in the process of administration, the
residuary beneficiaries are entitled to income from the date of death."'
If this rule is applied, the income accumulated by the estate to the start
of the community would constitute separate income of the beneficiary
and income received by the estate after that date would constitute
community income. The rules for determining whether any particular
distribution of income is out of the income accumulated before or after
September 1 would be the same as those for the discretionary trust
mentioned above. However, the Tax Court has held that under the
Texas law income collected in an estate before the marriage of the
beneficiary and distributed later constitutes community income.2 7 a This
rule is easy to apply and should be followed in Pennsylvania.
H. Rent
Although rent did not accrue from day to day at common law,
it has been held to accrue in that way in Pennsylvania." Hence, rent
accrued before the institution of the community would be separate
property no matter when collected.
25. Principal and Income Act of 1947 (Act No. 516), § 4.
26. Ibid.
27. Brown's Estate, 190 Pa. 464 (1899).
27a. Dargan v. Commissioner, Dkt. No. 10,317, C. C. H. Dec. 16,066(M) (1947).




The court in Commissioner v. King 0 distinguished adverse pos-
session cases from the case of a contingent fee contract. However
valid this distinction may be, the rule is that in cases of property
acquired by adverse possession the character of the property is deter-
mined by the status of the acquiring spouse at the time such a title
became mature, regardless of the length of the adverse possession be-
fore marriage. This is the rule in Texas."° It would seem that this
conclusion is logically inescapable. It is very hard to find in the adverse
possessor any right or matured interest until the prescriptive period
has run.
J. Royalties
Royalties which are based upon sales would constitute separate
income to the extent that they were paid on sales occurring before
September 1 and community income to the extent that they were based
on sales after that date. This should be the rule in the case of royalties
on patents or ideas of the spouse receiving the royalties. However,
if a royalty contract has been purchased before September 1 the spouse
purchasing the contract would have a capital investment in the con-
tract and would be entitled to recover that capital investment as his or
her separate property. Thus, the amount paid for the contract which
had not been recovered before September 1 could be recovered after
that date. Whether each payment would be considered as part capital
and part income, or whether each payment would be considered capital
until the full purchase price had been recovered is not clear. The




In the case of a mercantile partnership, income derived up to
September 1 should constitute the separate income of the partners.
Income derived after that date would constitute community income.3
It can be argued that no income (and hence no claim) arises until
the end of the year, since losses after September 1 could offset the
profits before that time. This argument has been rejected by the
Tax Court."'a Moreover, if a partner retired, resigned or died on
September 1, he or his estate would be entitled to a share of profits
29. Supra note 7.
30. Sauvage v. Wauhop, 143 S. W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; see Creamer v.
Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490, 109 S. W. 911 (1908).
31. I. T. 3792, 1946-1 C. B. 86; Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 (1944).
31a. Dargan v. Commissioner, Dkt. No. 10,317, C. C. H. Dec. 16,066 (M) (1947).
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to that date regardless of subsequent losses. 2  It would, there-
fore, be necessary to compute the income of the partnership up to
September 1. If such a partnership is on the accrual basis no problem
arises as to the items to be included in income. However, if the
partnership computes its income on a cash basis, the computation
should be made on the accrual basis because items might be sold and
not yet collected and claims would exist on September 1 for such items.
Those claims existing on that date would constitute separate property.
In the case of a personal service partnership, such as a law firm or
accounting partnership, the rules applicable to the determination of
whether compensation for personal services is separate income or com-
munity income would be applicable.
If the books of the partnership were not closed at the start of the
community, the income for the years must be apportioned. The method
of apportionment will depend on each case, but a monthly basis would
appear acceptable."'
L. Miscellaneous Property
A claim for refund of a federal tax paid before September 1 would
be separate property when recovered. However, suppose the refund
arises out of a carry-back of a loss occurring after September 1. Can
it be said that the refund is community property because it arose due
to a loss incurred by the community? It would seem that the refund
would be community property because it was not owned or claimed on
September 1. The right to the refund arose only when the loss oc-
curred and since this occurred after September 1, 1947 the amount
recovered would be community property.
Suppose a bad debt which has been deducted for federal income
tax purposes before September 1 is recovered in a year subsequent
to 1947. Under the federal income tax law such recovery constitutes
income. Since the debt was in existence on September 1, the amount
recovered on that debt would be separate property and thus if income
arises under the federal income tax law by reason of the recovery,
the income would be taxed to the person recovering the debt.
VII
THIRD-PARTY TRANSACTIONS
A. Scope of the Discussion
Suppose that a husband deals with community property under his
control and in so doing exceeds his managerial authority, that an
32. Assuming the partnership agreement made no provision as to this point.
33. Compare INT. REv. CODE § 711(a) (3) (1940) with U. S. Treas. Reg. 112,
§ 35.711 (a)-4 (1944). INT. REV. CODE § 22(b) (12) (Supp. 1946).
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outsider participates in the transaction, and that later the wife disavows
the transaction and seeks redress from the outsider. What general
rule should be applied in passing on the wife's claim? To suggest
an answer to this question is the purpose of this part of our article.
B. Nature of Community Ownership
The first step towards solution of our problem is to determine
the exact nature of community property ownership under the Penn-
sylvania statute.
Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Community Property Act provides
that each spouse "shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest"
in all community property. This, however, does not mean that each
spouse will necessarily have legal title to one-half of the property; for
other sections of the Act (e. g. Sections 4, 7, and 8) recognize that
legal title may stand in the name of one spouse alone. Therefore,
having in mind that under the Pennsylvania Act ownership and title
do not necessarily coincide, we shall examine the four theories of
community property ownership that have prevailed from time to time
in the old-line community property states and shall attempt to select
the one that best fits the Pennsylvania Act. 4
One of the four theories is known as the single ownership theory,
which formerly prevailed in California.35 Under this theory the hus-
band owns the community property, during his lifetime his wife has
a mere expectancy, and this expectancy ripens into a vested interest
only if the husband predeceases the wife. Plainly, this view does
not comport with the Pennsylvania Act: Section 3 states specifically
that each spouse is "vested with an undivided one-half interest".
Another theory is called the double ownership theory. It now
prevails in California, Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico. This theory
is that, regardless of how record title stands, each spouse has an
undivided one-half interest in all community property and each has
legal title to one-half of the property. Since the Pennsylvania Act
recognizes that title to community property may stand in the name of
one spouse alone, it is clear that the Act and the double ownership
theory are incompatible.
A third theory, known as the entity theory, is that the husband
and wife are an entity, that this entity holds legal title to all community
property (no matter who holds record title), and that the managing
34. For a full discussion of the four theories see Evans, The Omsership of Comn-
reunity Proiperty, 35 HARv. L. REv. 47 (1921).
35. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897).
36. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 134 Cal. App. 597, 25 P. 2d 843 (1933); Ewald v.
Hufton, 31 Idaho 373, 173 Pac. 247 (1918) ; In re Wilson's Est., 56 Nev. 353, 53 P. 2d
339 (1936) ; Beals v. Ares, 185 Pac. 780 (N. M. 1919).
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spouse is simply the agent of the entity. Washington is the chief
follower of this theory." Here again, the theory conflicts with the
notion, inherent in the Pennsylvania statute, that legal title may
be in one spouse alone.
The fourth theory, which was developed in Texas, is called the
trust theory. According to this theory, the spouse in whose name
the property stands holds the legal title as trustee and the equitable
ownership of the property is vested in both spouses equally. Here
is a typical statement of the theory:
when land belonging to the community of husband and
wife is deeded to both, each has legal title to it, but when the
conveyance is made to one only the legal title is vested in that
one, and the other has an equitable title. . . That one in whose
name the title is conveyed holds as trustee for the other."
The trust theory and the Pennsylvania Act fit together perfectly. Both
recognize that each spouse has a vested interest in one-half of the com-
munity property, and both recognize that title to the property may
stand in the name of either spouse or in the names of both. This being
so, it seems clear that the Pennsylvania legislature intended to adopt
the Texas theory; and if there were any doubt about this, it would
be dispelled by the fact that Pennsylvania's Act was copied from
Oklahoma's, which in turn was patterned after the law of Texas.
C. The Texas Rule as to Tran4erees
As a corollary to the trust theory of community property owner-
ship, it is the rule in Texas that if one spouse makes an unauthorized
transfer of community property to a third person, the transferee gets
a good title unless it appears that he either had notice or knowledge of
the lack of authority or else did not pay a valuable consideration for
the property. Moreover, the injured spouse (or the successor to the
interest of that spouse) has the burden of proving that the transferee
had notice or knowledge or that there was not a valuable consideration.
This is settled by a long line of cases.
89
37. Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484 (1900) ; Osthiller v. Spokane, etc., Rwy.
Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919) ; Olive v. Meek, 103 Wash. 467, 175 Pac. 33
(1918).
38. Mitchll v. Schofield, 106 Tex. 512, 514, 171 S. W. 1121, 1122 (1915). To
the same effect, see Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 195 S. W. 1139 (1917)
Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 17 S. W. 909 (1891).
39. E. g., Strong v. Strong, 128 Tex. 470, 98 S. W. 2d 346 (1936) ; Howard v.
Commonwealth B. & L. Assn., 127 Tex. 365, 94 S. W. 2d 144 (1936) ; Burnham v.
Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 195 S. W. 1139 (1917) ; Mitchell v. Schofield, 106 Tex.
512, 171 S. W. 1121 (1915); Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586, 17 S. W. 909 (1891);
Johnson v. Masterson Irr. Co., 217 S. W. 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Kirby Lumber
Co. v. Smith, 185 S. W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
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A typical example of the application of the Texas rule is Johnson
v. Masterson Irr. Co.40 There the husband held title to community
land. The wife died and her interest passed to her children. There-
after the husband remarried, and he and the bride executed a deed of
trust by which the land was pledged as security for a loan. On the
husband's default in repaying the loan, the trustee sold the land. Later
the children of the first wife brought suit against the purchaser at the
trustee's sale and asserted a claim to ownership of a one-half interest
in the land. The court rejected the claim and in so doing said:
" . ..it is now well settled that the title which passed to the
children of Johnson's first wife upon her death was an equitable
title, and the record in this case shows, without contradiction, that
the legal title to the tract of land in controversy stood in the name
of J. F. Johnson at the time of the execution of said deed of trust,
as well as at the time of the sale by the trustee and purchase by
the appellee; and, this being true, the burden of proof rested upon
appellants (the children) to show that appellee was not an in-
nocent purthaser of their equitable title or interest in this tract
of land." I
D. The Texas Rule as to Disinterested Participants in Unauthorized
Transactions
Having found the Texas rule fixing the liability of third persons
who receive the benefit of an unauthorized transfer of community prop-
erty, let us now look for the rule that applies where a third person
participates in an unautlorized transaction by one of the spouses but
does not derive any real benefit from it.
As far as we know, the only Texas case dealing with the exact
problem is Grebe v. First State Bank.42 There a widow, having paid
all community debts, withdrew community funds from the bank and lent
them to her brother. When the bank paid over the funds, it knew that
the widow intended to make the loan, that she had no right to do so,
and that the husband left a minor child who had an interest in the
funds. Later the minor brought suit against the bank and recovered.
One judge dissented on this ground:
"From now on no bank can pay to a survivor in community
any part of a community bank account without running the risk
of having to pay again to the heirs. This must be true, because
in the very nature of the transaction the bank would assume the
burden of proving that it was necessary to pay such account to
40. 217 S. W. 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
41. Id. at 410.
42. 136 Tex. 226, 150 S. W. 2d 64 (1941).
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the survivor in order for him to pay community debts. Under
the rule announced by the majority, no debtor of the community
can afford to pay his debt to the survivor for the same reason." "
The decision in the Grebe case seemingly conflicts with a line of
Texas cases holding that where an outsider takes part in a trustee's
breach of trust but gets no benefit from it, the outsider is not liable
to the victim." Since the spouse who holds title to community prop-
erty is a trustee, the rule laid down in this line of cases should apply
to unauthorized community property transactions.
Of all the cases in the line just mentioned, the case of Interstate
National Bank v. Claxton45 is most enlightening because it accentuates
the importance of one's benefiting or not benefiting from taking part
in a breach of trust: the bank, which occupied the role of the third
person, was held liable for its participation in a breach of trust that
benefited it but was not held liable for other breaches that did not
benefit it. The facts were as follows. Tamblin & Tamblin, acting as
factors, sold some livestock belonging to Claxton and, pursuant to
authoiity from him, deposited the proceeds of sale in their account
at the bank. When the bank received the deposit, it knew that the
money did not belong to the depositor (Tamblin & Tamblin) and it
also knew that the depositor was insolvent. Thereafter the bank
applied part of the funds so deposited against a claim that it had
against the depositor and used the balance of the funds to pay checks
drawn by the depositor to the order of others. After the depositor was
adjudged bankrupt, Claxton asserted a claim against the bank for
the entire amount of the deposit. Because the bank benefited by the
application of part of the deposit in payment of its claim against its
depositor, it was held liable for the amount so applied; but because it
did not benefit by the payment of the checks, it was excused from
liability for the amount used to pay them even though when it paid
them it knew that its action would result in a misapplication of trust
funds. In holding that the bank was entitled, indeed bound, to honor
the check, the Supreme Court of Texas said:46
. it is clear that a depositor, although holding money in a
fiduciary capacity, may draw it out of the bank ad libitum. The
bank is bound to honor his checks and incurs no liability in so
doing as long as it does not participate in any misapplication of
funds or breach of trust. The mere payment of money to, or upon
43. Id. at 237, 150 S. W. 2d at 70.
44. E. g., Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank, 127 Tex. 158, 93 S. W. 2d
143 (1936) ; Silisbee State Bank v. French Market Groc. Co., 103 Tex. 629, 132 S.W.
465 (1910) ; Interstate National Bank v. Claxton, 97 Tex. 569, 80 S. W. 604 (1904).
45. 97 Tex. 569, 80 S. W. 604 (1904).
46. Id. at 576, 80 S. W. at 606.
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the checks of, the depositor does not constitute a participation
in an actual or intended misappropriation by the fiduciary, al-
though his conduct or course of dealing may bring to the notice of
the bank circumstances which would enable it to know that he is
violating his trust. Such circumstances do not impose upon the
bank the duty or give it the right to institute an inquiry into the
conduct of its customer in order to protect those for whom it may
hold the fund, but between whom and the bank there is no
privity."
The Court then proceeded to quote from Gray v. Johnson 7 and thus
made it doubly clear that a stranger who participates in a breach of
trust incurs no liability unless the breach inures to " 'his own personal
benefit.'" 48
If the doctrine of the Claxton case is blended with the Texas trust
theory of community property ownership, the result would seem to be
that where a title-holding spouse engages in an unauthorized trans-
action involving community property and an outsider participates in
the transaction but derives no benefit from it, the outsider is not liable
to the injured spouse even though he may have had notice or actual
knowledge of the whole story. However, in the face of the Grebe
case 49 it can hardly be said that this is the law of Texas.
E. T7he Suggested Rule for Pennsylvania
If Pennsylvania should adopt the rule of the Grebe case, business
transactions with married persons will be hopelessly snarled. If banks,
insurance companies, and other financial or commercial institutions
are to be required to police the activities of their married customers,
they quite properly will refuse to take any step where there is the
slightest room for doubt or suspicion; and the result will be that
married persons will be subjected to red tape and delays, and the courts
will be flooded with interpleader proceedings. All of this trouble can
be avoided by rejecting the rule of the Grebe case and adopting a rule
such as this:
Where a spouse who holds title to community property enters
into a transaction involving that property and in so doing exceeds
his managerial powers, an outsider who participates in the trans-
action but does not derive any direct and substantial benefit from it
incurs no liability to the injured spouse-and this even though the
outsider has notice or knowledge of all the facts; and even where
the outsider derives direct and substantial benefit from the trans-
47. L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. Cas. 1 (1868).
48. 97 Tex. at 577, 80 S. W. at 607.
49. Supra, note 42, and discussion pertaining thereto.
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action, he still has no liability unless the injured spouse (or the
successor to the interest of that spouse) proves either that the out-
sider had notice or knowledge of all the facts or else that he did
not put up a valuable consideration for the benefit that he received.
This rule would enable married persons to deal freely with their prop-
erty and would go a long way towards eliminating the widespread dis-
satisfaction caused by Pennsylvania's sudden shift to the community
property system.
The suggested rule could not justifiably be criticized on the ground
that it gives too little protection to the interest of the non-managing
spouse. In the first place, most people are honest; and it is better to
make it possible for the few dishonest ones to cheat their spouses than
to make it impossible for the innumerable honest ones to deal freely with
their property. In the second place, the only reason why the Com-
munity Property Act gives the non-managing spouse an interest is that
the tax savings at which the Act is aimed could not be obtained with-
out the gift of the interest. Obviously, there would be no merit to a
complaint that an interest created as a by-product of a tax-saving
measure does not come packaged in armor plate.
F. Section 6
Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Act provides:
"Any funds on deposit in any bank or banking institution, whether
in the name of the husband or wife, shall be presumed to be the
separate property of the party in whose name they stand, regard-
less of who made the deposit, and unless said bank or banking
institution is notified to the contrary it shall be governed accord-
ingly in honoring checks and orders against such account."
At first sight, this section seems to cover, so far as banks are concerned,
the problem we have been discussing. However, a close examination
of the section will show that it falls short of the problem.
Suppose, for example, that a husband deposits community funds
in a bank account in his name, that he proposes to withdraw some of
the funds for a non-community purpose (e. g. to make a gift to his
mistress), and that the bank knows the purpose of the withdrawal.
Should the bank permit the withdrawal? Section 6 supplies the an-
swer as long as the bank is not on notice that community funds are
in the account. In the absence of such notice, the bank may assume
that the funds are the husband's separate property; and since he has
the right to give his separate property to his mistress, the bank would
incur no risk by permitting the withdrawal. But suppose that the
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bank gets notice that the funds belong to the community. Then it
knows that the husband is about to misapply community funds and
thus is faced squarely with the problem we have been discussing. To
get the answer, the bank will have to look beyond Section 6.
One situation where Section 6 might come into play is this. Sup-
pose that a wife desposits her earnings in a bank account in her hus-
band's name. Under Section 4 the power to manage and control the
earnings is vested in her; and because that section does not say that
the husband shall have management and control of community property
standing in his name [in this respect the section treats husband and
wife differently], the deposit of the earnings in the husband's account
would not shift control from the wife to the husband. In this situation
Section 6 would protect the bank in honoring checks drawn by the
husband as long as the bank does not receive notice that the wife's
earnings are in the account.5" But once the bank gets such notice, it
will be faced with a dilemma: which one, the husband or the wife, is
entitled to sign checks? Here again, Section 6 does not supply the
answer.
There is another type of situation where Section 6 might afford
limited help to a bank. Suppose that a husband deposits community
funds in his own bank account and then dies. If the bank has no
notice that community property is in the account, presumably Section
6 would entitle it to pay over the entire balance to the husband's
executor or administrator.51  If, however, the bank has notice of the
true composition of the balance, then Section 6 does not help. The
bank will have to wrestle with the problem of whether to turn over
the funds to the widow or to the executor or administrator.
50. The origin of the language of Section 6 indicates that this is the type of situa-
tion at which the section is really aimed. The prototype of the section is to be found in
TEXAs AcTs oF 1913, ch. 32, p. 61, TEx. Civ. STAT., Art. 4622 (Vernon, 1914). The
probability is that Texas adopted the provision in order to circumvent the decision,
handed down one year earlier, in Waggoner Bank & Trust Co. v. Warren, 152 S. W.
691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), to the effect that the husband, being vested by statute with
the power to manage and control his wife's separate estate, was entitled to withdraw
her separate funds on deposit with the bank despite the fact that the account stood
in the wife's name and the bank had agreed that the funds would be subject to with-
drawal only by the wife. Nine years after the decision and eight years after the stat-
ute, the decision was reversed: 111 Tex. 318, 234 S. W. 387 (1921). For an explana-
tion of the purpose of the statute, see Winters v. Duncan, 220 S. W. 219 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920).
51. In a situation of this sort, the presumption created by Section 6-that the
deposit is separate property-appears to conflict with the presumption created by
Section 3-that on death all property belongs to the community. In Texas, where
there is the same conflict, it has been held that the statutory presumption concerning
bank accounts "was meant for the guidance of the bank in its dealings with the deposit
or account of the spouse in whose name it is, and was also meant to apply to dealings
of creditors generally with the spouse in whose name it is. 'It was never meant to
supplant, even as to such deposit itself, the general presumption' of community estate":
Rippy v. Rippy, 49 S. W. 2d 494, 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). To the same effect, see
Callaway v. Clark, 200 S. W. 2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Winters v. Duncan, 220
S. W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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One question raised by the language of Section 6 is whether an
informal notice is enough to deprive a bank of the presumption created
by the section. It has been suggested that notice by itself is not enough
to destroy the presumption. The basis for this suggestion is paragraph
A of Section 905 of the Pennsylvania Banking Code, 2 which provides
that a notice of an adverse claim to a bank deposit shall not be effective
unless the claimant procures either an attachment or a restraining
order. However, paragraph B of Section 905 would seem to enable
the claimant to substitute an affidavit in place of the attachment or
restraining order; for paragraph B provides that the Section shall not
apply "where the person to whose credit the deposit stands is a fiduci-
ary for such adverse claimant" and all of the pertinent facts are sup-
plied to the bank in an affidavit. Under the trust theory of community
property ownership, which appears likely to be adopted in Penn-
sylvania, the title-holding spouse is a fiduciary and hence the case
should come squarely within paragraph B. Even if adverse claims to
deposits in community funds were held to come under paragraph B,
rather than paragraph A, of Section 905, the section would at least have
the effect of prescribing the form of notice to be given under Sec-
tion 6 of the Community Property Act and thus would clear up un-
certainty whether a bank must pay attention to information that it
picks up in a casual way.
In conclusion, while Section 6 of the Act affords limited protec-
tion to banks, it does not go far enough to solve their problem




The extent to which a spouse may make a gift of community
property in Pensylvania is one of the questions involved in the case
of Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co.,5" which is now pend-
ing in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In view of the prospect
of a decision in the near future, we shall discuss the question of gifts
only to the extent necessary to explain certain decisions relating to life
insurance policies.54
A. The Washington Rule
The courts of the State of Washington have adopted the rule that
the husband has practically no power to give away community property
52. 7 PA. STAT. ANN. § 819-905 (Purdon, 1940).
53. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (W. D.) Miscl. Dkt. No. 1490.
54. For an excellent analysis of the scope of a spouse's power to give away com-
munity property, see 18 TEx. L. REv. 121 et seq. (1940).
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without his wife's consent; only trifling gifts within the rule of de
minimis are excepted.55
B. The California Rule
By statute California has deprived the husband of all power to
give community property to third persons unless he obtains the written
consent of his wife.5"
C. The Texas Rule
The Texas courts have not yet fully determined the extent of a
husband's power to give away community property. In the recent
case of Allen v. Brewster 5 7 the Court of Civil Appeals stated that
although the husband is given authority to dispose of community
property, he cannot " . . . make gifts of his wife's interest in the com-
munity estate to third persons . . ." 58 The case was reversed by the
Supreme Court of Texas, 9 but, in reversing, the higher court did not
refer to the quoted statement. Therefore, the rule, as stated by the
Court of Civil Appeals in Allen v. Brewster " cannot be considered the
settled law of Texas today.
The earlier Texas cases hold that the husband has some power
to donate community property to third persons,"' but that his power
is subject to limitations. The first is that the size of the gift must not
be unreasonable in relation to the amount of community property
remaining after the gift is made, and the second is that the husband
may not make a gift, even of a moderate amount, with intent to de-
fraud his wife. 2 The Texas courts have not clearly defined what they
mean by "intent to defraud", but it has been suggested that, in deter-
mining the meaning of this phrase, they may apply the defrauded-
creditor rule by analogy. 3
The foregoing discussion shows that the Texas courts have not
yet adopted a clear rule concerning the husband's power to make a
gift of community property to a third person. However, this discus-
sion has outlined the pertinent aspects of the Texas rule in sufficient
detail for us to turn to an analysis of some important cases relating
to life insurance policies.
55. Id. at 123.
56. Id. at 125.
57. 172 S. W. 2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
58. Id. at 196.
59. Allen v. Brewster, 142 Tex. 127, 176 S. W. 2d 311 (1943).
60. Supra note 56.
61. 18 TEx. L. Rav. 126 (1940).
62. Id. at 128 et seq.
63. Id. at 132.
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Ix
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES AND THE PROCEEDS THEREOF
A. General Considerations
1. Nature of Life Insurance: Modern life insurance policies " are
to an overwhelming proportion based on level premium calculations,
under which each premium has two elements: one to cover the cost of
carrying the risk of death in that particular year, and the other to go
toward gradually building up the "reserve" which in later years
prevents the premium cost from growing to impossibly high propor-
tions. In life insurance the risk insured against is death, which is
bound to happen at some time, while in other types of insurance there
is no such certainty of occurrence, and, therefore, no such urgent need
of a' steadily increasing reserve. The life insurance reserve, grow-
ing larger year by year, causes a corresponding decrease in the amount
which must be covered by the first of the two portions of the premium
referred to above (which amount is the maturity value of the policy
less the amount already accumulated in the reserve).
The usual life insurance policy today has two aspects:
(a) The payment of the proceeds ("death benefit" or "face value"
of the policy) at the occurrence of the risk insured against. In this
aspect the life insurance policy resembles other types of insurance.
However, in the case of life insurance (contrary to the situation in
other types of insurance) the payee of such matured policy (except in
Texas) " need not have an insurable interest still existing, provided
that he had such an insurable interest when the policy was taken out,
and he does not need ever to have had an insurable interest, if the
policy was paid for the beneficiary designated by the person whose life
is insured, who, of course, is said to have an unlimited insurable inter-
est in his own life. It should be noted that such person is called "the
insured" in life insurance, although he may have no connection with
the 1articular policy in question except to furnish the measuring rod
through the means of his life span. In other types of insurance, the
"assured" or the "insured" is understood to be the person who will
receive payment under the policy to indemnify him against loss in
case of the happening of the risk insured against.
64. For an excellent general discussion of life insurance problems in community
property jurisdictions, see W. 0. Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life
Insurance. 17 Tax. L. Rxv. 121 (1939) and 18 TEx. L. Rav. 121 (1940).
65. Wilke v. Finn, 39 S. W. 2d 836 (Tex. 1931). But cf. Castillo v. Canales, 141
Tex. 479, 174 S. W. 2d 251 (1943), where it was held that a member of a fraternal
benefit society can name in a benefit certificate anyone as beneficiary, regardless of
whether such beneficiary has an insurable interest in the member's life.
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(b) The rights relating to the reserve fund prior to maturity.
These rights of course include control of the surrender value, the loan
value, of the so-called "dividends" representing refunds of unused por-
tions of the previous year's premiums, and of the privileges to convert
the policy into a paid-up one, to elect the extended insurance feature,
and to exercise other life-time options under the policy.
It must be remembered that in community property jurisdictions
an item of property is deemed to be community property if it was
acquired by payment from community funds or by exchange for other
community property.66  Therefore, if during marriage one spouse
acquires legal title to an asset in his or her own name by use of com-
munity property, such asset becomes part of the community estate.
the question to which this section of the article is addressed is the
extent to which this principle affects life insurance policies of which all
or part of the premiums were paid from community funds. The answer
sometimes must be given by the courts after the death benefit has be-
come payable (at which time all the rights under the life-time aspect
referred to above have ceased to exist) ; sometimes the answer must be
given before maturity, when the investment features of the policy are
still important.
2. Public Policy Aspects Involved in Life Insurance: The rights
of the spouses in a life insurance contract and the right of the insurance
company to pay out the proceeds or other benefits to the persons named
in the contract present two separate problems. Public policy demands
that insurance proceeds be paid out promptly. The insurance com-
pany should be protected in paying the persons named in the contract
even if it has notice that premiums have been paid from community
property and without its having the duty to investigate the source of
premium payments. After payment by the insurance company, the
spouses or those taking from them, can apportion the proceeds. Under
our discussion of third-party transactions we have suggested how banks
and insurance companies should be protected in dealing with the per-
sons named in the agreements of the companies.
In view of the investment features involved in the lifetime aspect
of a life insurance policy, it might be assumed that the use of com-
munity funds to pay life insurance premiums by one spouse without
the approval of the other would automatically give to the non-assenting
spouse the right to assert as to the insurance company that the policy
itself is community property in the proportion that the premiums were
paid from community funds.
66. Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
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However, before any such view is accepted consideration must
be given to the public interest involved in making it possible for life
insurance companies to act promptly upon requests for loans and sur-
render values and upon other life-time requests, as well as in paying
death benefits. The life insurance companies in most instances have
no knowledge as to the nature of the funds tendered in payment of
premiums and no ability to maintain accounting records as between
community property payments, payments by a spouse from separate
property, and payments by third persons. It would be intolerable to the
public if rules of community property law should force life insurance
companies to file interpleader proceedings or other legal actions every
time a married policy-holder is involved in a request for action under
a policy both before maturity and after the death benefits become
payable.
Often, of course, such litigation could be avoided where the request
for action comes from the record holder of legal ownership of the
policy and such person under the community property law is granted
powers of management over community property of which title stands
in his name. Thus a surrender of the policy by the husband would
be within his management powers; if the other spouse had a com-
munity property interest in the policy before surrender, that interest
would be transferred to the cash fund received by the husband as a
result of the surrender. However, the management power does not
remove practical difficulties if the question concerns payment of the
death benefit to a third person upon the death of the insured husband,
nor are they removed if in his life-time the insured husband (being
the record owner of a policy under which premiums were paid from
community funds) attempts to assign a policy to someone who is a
stranger to the community, or is indeed a person to whom the wife
would unquestionably object. Additional practical difficulties arise
when the management power itself terminates upon the dissolution of
the community by divorce or by death of a spouse. Frequently upon
such termination the insurance company is faced with conflicting
claims to a policy or its proceeds.
The administrative difficulties above mentioned are somewhat
lessened, as to'proceeds of matured policies, by statutes and decisions 17
in some community property states which absolve the life insurance
company of any risk of liability to the complaining spouse if before
notice of any use of community funds to pay premiums it has paid
the death benefit to the beneficiary or assignee entitled according to
the documents on file with the company. Several of the old community
67. Blethen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 198 Cal. 91, 243 Pac. 431 (1926).
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property states, such as Texas 68 and California,69 have such a statute.
All community property statutes enacted so far in 1947, except Penn-
sylvania's, contain a similar provision. 71 On the other hand, the
Oklahoma law lacks any such provision.
Statutory provisions such as those just mentioned do not, how-
ever, aid in prompt settlements when the complaining spouse gives
notice of her or his community property claim before payment of
the death benefit. -Interpleader of the record beneficiary or assignee
with the complaining spouse, with its attendant costs, delays and com-
plications, is the usual course for the life insurance company in the
face of such a conflict (even if the spouse's claim is actually without
any basis) because the life insurance company has in most cases no
means of itself determining the merits of the two claims with certainty.
Furthermore, such statutory provisions dealing with death bene-
fits carry no protection to the life insurance company in dealing with
the record owner of its policies prior to maturity-as in the case of
divorce or of assignment to a stranger. Here again the company
should be protected in dealing with the record holder of title in the
absence of notice of facts as to an adverse claim by his or her spouse,
but it might be questioned as to whether a mere notice of divorce or
a formal statement by a spouse that a certain premium was paid from
community funds would be enough to put the insurance company in
a position where it could no longer safely deal with the record title
holder without joinder by the other spouse (or ex-spouse).
The considerations referred to above have no doubt been respon-
sible for the reluctance of some courts of community property states
to hold that mere payment of certain premiums from community cash
by one spouse who holds record ownership of a life insurance policy
gives to the other spouse such a property right or interest in the policy
as would arise if the money needed to pay premiums, instead of
being used for that purpose had been deposited in the separate bank
account of the first spouse or otherwise mingled with his property.
There is no question that in case of dissolution of the community by
death or divorce the spouse who made such payments might be held
personally liable from his own separate property for the amount of
value arising from such premium payments (if the payment is held to be
outside the management power). But the Texas courts have declined,
after maturity, to allow the complaining spouse to recover any part
of the death benefit payable on the record to a third party as beneficiary,
68. T~x. Civ. STAT., Art. 4736a (Vernon, 1931).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE, § 10172 (Deering, 1941).
70. MIcH. CoMM. PROP. Acr § 16, effective July 1, 1947; NEBR. Co M. PROP.
Ac. § 7, effective Sept. 7, 1947; OREx. Com. PROP. Act § 14, effective Sept. 7, 1947.
212 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
leaving such spouse to assert the claim as a money one in the settlement
of the interest of the deceased spouse in other community or separate
property. 71
Even where, before maturity of the policy, the courts have used
language indicating that the complaining spouse gained a "property
interest" in the policy, it has been accompanied on occasion by language
like that in Locke v. Locke 72 which dealt with a settlement after
'divorce. There the court said that the "property" interest of the
complaining spouse could not be enforced by a decree requiring the
husband to surrender the life policy which stood in his ownership and
upon which the premiums had been paid from community property,
but that such interest merely gave rise to a right in the complaining
spouse to collect half the surrender value at the time of divorce from
other property belonging to her ex-husband. It might well be doubted
whether Texas treats such a right as a property interest in the policy
itself were it not for the later decision of the same court in Berdoll
v. Berdoll,73 where the stirrender of such a policy for its cash value
was directed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Texas in Womack
v. Womack ' cited both the Locke and Berdoll cases in writing:
"The courts of this State have held that the 'cash surrender value'
of a policy is property and may be considered and treated as com-
munity property." 7
3. Pertinent provisions of Pennsylvania Act. The pertinent pro-
visions of the Pennsylvania Community Property Act have already
been quoted in this article. However, certain sections are particularly
important with respect to problems relating to life insurance. Section
3 of the Act arrives at a definition of community property by the process
of exclusion. This section states that all property acquired during
marriage, which is not the separate property ofeither spouse, shall be
deemed to be community property. Section 4 gives the wife the power
of management, control and disposition of all community property,
the title to which stands in her name. The same section gives the
husband similar powers over all other community property. These
provisions of Sections 3 and 4 are, with one exception, substantially
the same as the equivalent provisions in the Texas statute.7" The
exception is that the Texas statute gives the power of disposition of all
community property to the husband alone during coverture, whereas
71. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 197 S. W. 2d 105 (1946).
72. 143 S. W. 2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
73. 145 S. W. 2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), expressly approved in Chapman v.
v. Chapman, 172 S. W. 2d 127 (1943).
74. 141 Tex. 299, 172 S. W. 2d 307 (1943).
75. Id. at 308.
76. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT., Art. 4619, § 1 (Vernon, 1936).
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Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Act permits the wife to dispose of that
part of the community property, the title to which is in her name.
Because of these statutory similarities, it is believed that the Texas
decisions will in most cases be followed by the Pennsylvania Courts
when questions involving life insurance are submitted to them. Obvi-
ously, there will be exceptions, and an example would be a case where
the wife is the record owner of a life insurance policy and wishes to
dispose of it. The Pennsylvania statute appears to give her the neces-
sary power to do so but under the Texas statute she would be unable
to do so without her husband's joinder. Instances where we believe
that the Pennsylvania Courts may not follow the Texas decisions will
be specifically referred to in the following discussion.
4. Time of acquisition as test. It is well settled that the status
as community or separate property of the proceeds of a policy insuring
a married person is not governed by the marital status of the insured
at the time of his or her death.77 In some community property juris-
dictions, such as Louisiana and New Mexico, the time of the issuance
of the policy controls such status of the proceeds, so that the other
spouse is held to have no community property interest in proceeds
of a policy having its inception before marriage, even though com-
munity funds are used in payment of premiums after marriage.78
5. Character of funds used to pay premiums as test. Other com-
munity property jurisdictions, notably California, 79 Washington 80 and
Texas,"' have held in some cases that where the common property has
contributed to the premiums which give rise to the fund representing
the proceeds of the policy, the community should receive such propor-
tion of the proceeds as the premiums paid from community property
bear to the total amount of premiums. The balance of the proceeds,
representing the proportion paid with premiums from separate property,
is held to be the separate property of the deceased spouse, payable to
the beneficiary or assignee named by the deceased spouse. The Cali-
fornia courts have, however, shown some sympathy for the Louisiana
rule based upon the status of the insured at the time of inception
77. In re Castagnola's Est., 68 Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924).
78. Succession of Farrell, 200 La. 29, 7 So. 2d 605 (1942) ; Succession of Lewis,
192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939) ; Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La.
623, 173 So. 126 (1937) ; In re White's Estate. 43 N. M. 202, 89 P. 2d 36 (1939).
Where the proceeds of the policy are separate property, the community estate is en-
titled to a credit for premiums paid out of it; Succession of Lewis, supra.
79. McBride v. McBride, 54 P. 2d 480 (Cal. 1930) ; Modern Woodmen of Amer-
ica v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 Pac. 754 (1931) ; New York Life Insurance Co.
v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 Pac. 61 (1923).
80. In re Coffey's Est., 81 P. 2d 283 (Wash. 1938).
81. Berdoll v. Berdoll, 145 S. W. 2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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of the policy. In the case of In re Castagnola's Estate,2 the court
wrote as follows:
". We are satisfied, upon the authority of the cases cited
from Louisiana, and upon principle, that the status of the parties
at the time the insurance contract was executed, or at least
throughout the period of the payment of the premiums, is the
controlling feature in the determination of whether the policy is
community or separate property." 83
It is suggested that this rule of proportionate ownership is the proper
one for the Pennsylvania courts to follow.
6. Factual situations (assuming policy is issued during marriage
and the premiums entirely paid with community property).
(a) Where insured names own estate as beneficiary. Where the
husband during marriage insures his own life, making the proceeds
payable to his own estate, and the premiums are paid out of community
funds, all community property jurisdictions hold that the proceeds
arising as a result of such premium payments belong to the com-
munity."4 In Pennsylvania the result should be the same if the wife
insures her life for the benefit of her own estate. In effect this means
that one-half of the proceeds is payable to the estate of the insured
and one-half to the surviving spouse. Sometimes the courts justify
their conclusion by stating that a hitsband cannot validly make a gift
to himself of community property, and thereby, as a result of his own
act alone, change the status of community property into separate prop-
erty of his own. Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation is that since
the chose in action (represented by the policy) is community property
because it was acquired during marriage with community funds, the
proceeds belong to the community. This explanation is in accordance
with the general rule that where community property is used to acquire
additional property, the latter assumes the same character as the
property utilized in its acquisition. Since in the facts here assumed,
we have no interests of third persons involved, it is easy to apply the
customary rule as to tracing funds.
(b) Where insured names other spouse as beneficiary. All com-
munity property states are in agreement that where the husband
insures his own life during marriage, naming his wife as beneficiary,
and pays the premiums with community funds, the proceeds are the
82. 68 Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924).
83. Id. at 190.
84. In re Castagnola's Est., 68 Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924) ; Succession of
LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917) ; In re Brown's Est., 124 Wash. 273, 214 P.
10 (1923) ; Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S. W. 904 (1895).
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separate property of the wife. 5 The converse of this situation should
hold true in Pennsylvania if the wife insured her life and named her
husband as beneficiary. The result in other jurisdictions is explained
on the grounds that the husband is presumed to have made a gift to
his wife of his interest in the community funds used to pay the
premiums and therefore of the proceeds arising therefrom. If the hus-
band reserves the right to change the beneficiary under such a policy,
the gift to his wife does not become fully effective until his death.
Assuming that the husband reserved such a right with respect to the
policies involved, Blackmon v. Hansen 6 follows this rule. That
case came before the Supreme Court of Texas as a suit by the wife
against the Texas tax collector to recover a portion of the state
inheritance tax paid on her husband's estate. The question of whether
there was an over-payment depended on whether the total or only one-
half of the proceeds collected from insurance policies on the husband's
life were to be included in his gross estate. The policies were issued
during marriage at the application of the insured and upon his own
life, and the wife was named as beneficiary. All the premiums were
paid from community funds. The opinion of the supreme court does
not expressly state whether the husband reserved the right to change
the beneficiary or not. In the earlier opinion of the Court of Civil
Appeals, 7 the court seemed to assume that the right to change the
beneficiary was reserved because it wrote as follows:
" . . . if there was a privilege in the policies to change the bene-
ficiary, its exercise could have defeated her interest. But even if
there was such a power, he did not choose to exercise it and left
her money invested for her benefit." 8
This case originally was referred to a special commissioner and in his
report 89 he stated that the stipulation did not disclose whether the
husband had reserved the right to change the beneficiary or any other
incidents of ownership. In affirming the decision, the supreme court
held that only one-half of the proceeds should be included as part of
the husband's gross estate. The decision seems correct on the ground
that since the husband's gift to his wife would not be completed until
his right to change the beneficiary was terminated by his death, his
85. Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 201, 134 S. W. 2d 1042 (1940) ;
San Jacinto Bldg., Inc. v. Brown, 79 S. W. 2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; Evans v.
Opperman, 76 Tex. 293, 13 S. W. 312 (1890) ; In re Miller's Est., 23 Cal. App. 2d 16,
71 P. 2d 1117 (1937).
86. 169 S. W. 2d 962 (Tex. 1943).
87. Hansen v. Blackmon, 169 S. W. 2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
88. Id. at 959.
89. Id. at 961.
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half interest in the community property asset represented by the policy
was properly includible in the amount on which his estate was sub-
jected to inheritance tax.
The same result as that pointed out above will no doubt occur
if the husband should name his wife's own estate as beneficiary of a
policy which he takes out on her life. As in the case of his using
community funds for premiums on a policy on his own life under which
he has named his wife as beneficiary, so in this case his act in naming
her estate as beneficiary must be deemed as a gift or waiver of any
community property claim he might otherwise have to the proceeds
when she dies.
A somewhat similar problem may arise in Pennsylvania which
would not occur in most community property states. The older com-
munity property jurisdictions generally place the management and
control of all community property in the hands of the husband alone.
However, under Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Act, the wife has the
management and control of that part of community property, the title
to which stands in her name. Under this provision, it would be pos-
sible for the wife to use such community property to pay the premiums
on a policy insuring the life of her husband (or her own life), under
which she herself had named as beneficiary the husband's estate (or
the husband himself, as to the policy on her own life). Under these
circumstances, it is suggested that the proper rule for the Pennsylvania
courts to apply is that which is applied in the other jurisdictions when
the husband has been the active force in naming the wife (or her
estate) as beneficiary.
(c) Where husband insures the life of wife for his own benefit.
Martin v. McAllister," a Texas decision, is an anomaly unless it is
assumed that the wife consented by joining in the application for in-
surance or by submitting to a medical examination. In it the court
held that when the husband insured the life of his wife, naming himself
as beneficiary, and the premiums were paid from community property,
the proceeds were not community property but were part of the hus-
band's separate estate. 1  This holding is an unusual one and appears
to be inconsistent with the situations already discussed. The better
90. 94 Tex. 567, 63 S. W. 624 (1901).
91. The Court simply stated .that the proceeds belonged to the person named as
payee and became that person's property upon the death of the insured. The court
reasoned that since the proceeds were received by the husband after the death of the
insured, they could not be community property. This reasoning ignores the funda-
mental nature of insurance, namely, that the contract right evidenced by the policy is
property. The decision cannot be justified on the theory that there was a gift to the
husband because the court assumed that the wife did not consent to the issuance of the
policy on her life nor to the payment of premiums out of community property. Since
the wife could not have made a gift to the husband under these circumstance , the pro-
ceeds should have been held to be community property.
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view would be that such proceeds were community property because
they arose from community funds and no rights of third persons were
involved.
(d) Where third party is beneficiary. The various community
property jurisdictions are not in agreement concerning the disposition
of the proceeds in cases where the husband has paid the premiums on
a policy on his life with community funds and has named a third party
as beneficiary.
California has had a statute since 1891 which deprives the hus-
band of the power to give community personal property to third
persons unless his wife gives her written consent." The California
court held in Beenter v. Roher,3 in a contest between the wife and
the named beneficiary, that half the proceeds due on the husband's death
were payable to his wife and that the balance went to the third party
who on the record was beneficiary of the whole proceeds. Washington
does not have the equivalent of California's statutory limitation on
gifts, but the rule in Washington is even more limited, because the
designation of a third party as beneficiary by the insured husband
without the wife's joinder is ineffective even as to half of the proceeds
when the premiums have been paid from community funds. Washing-
ton under such circumstances treats the entire proceeds of the policy
as community property."4
Neither Louisiana 95 nor Texas "6 have such a positive prohibi-
tion against gifts being made by the husband (without his wife's
approval) from community property under his management. In Texas
a recent case "' held that the beneficiary named by the husband was
92. CAL. CIv. CODE § 172 (Deering, 1937).
93. 30 P. 2d 547 (Cal. App. 1934).
94. Small v. Baktyzel, 177 P. 2d 391 (Wash. 1947) ; In re Towey's Est. 22 Wash.
2d 212, 155 P. 2d 273 (1945) ; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74
P. 2d 27 (1937).
95. Pearce v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 12 La. App. 608, 125 So. 776 (1930).
The value of the case may be questioned because there is no statement in the opinion
concerning the source of the premiums; the wife merely alleged that the proceeds be-
longed to the community.
96. Jones v. Jones, 146 S. W. 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; cf. Moore v. California-
Western States Life Ins. Co., 67 S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). In James v.
United States of America, 12 Life Cases 739, which was decided on June 16, 1947, by
the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, it was
held:
1. That under the community property laws of the State of Texas, where
there is no intention on the part of the husband to defraud his wife, the proceeds
of a policy on the husband's life vest in the beneficiary named in the policy upon
the husband's death even though the policy was taken out by the husband during
coverture and the premiums were paid out of community funds.
2. That the disposition of the proceeds of insurance issued pursuant to the
National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 is not subject to and cannot be con-
trolled or governed by the community property laws of any state.
97. Volunteer State Life Insurance Co. v. Hardin, 197 S. W. 2d 105 (Tex. 1946).
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entitled to the full proceeds of a policy on the husband's life under
which premiums were paid by the husband from community property,
prior to his wife's death, which occurred before the insured husband
died. The death of the insured terminates the group of life-time rights,
and matures the right of the named beneficiary to the proceeds. The
Texas court held that such interest in the policy as the wife might have
had before the insured's death related to the surrender value only, and
upon the insured's death the wife's estate had no rights to the proceeds
themselves. Any right against her husband's estate in the community
settlement is based upon the amount of the cash value prior to maturity
and not upon the amount of the proceeds after maturity.
B. Rights and Liabilities of the Spouses
1. Right to surrender policy for cash. It has been suggested 98
that a new theory is being developed by the Texas Courts concerning
the rights of the spouses prior to maturity in policies under which
premiums have been paid out of community property. This theory is
based upon the fact (already noted above) that the usual life insurance
policy today is composed of two elements: the annual sum paid for
current protection and the amount going into the reserve to keep the
premium level in later years. The amount accumulating in the reserve
is subject to withdrawal as a loan or to surrender under the terms of
the policy. In cases where this amount has been built up by premiums
paid from community property, the general rule relating to purchases
made with community property would preserve to the community
partners a claim based upon the amount of the cash surrender value, or
perhaps make the right to the surrender value itself a community asset,
at least until that right is extinguished as a separate right by the
maturing of the policy through death.
Locke v. Locke " is one of the first cases in Texas to recognize
this theory. At the time Mr. and Mrs. Locke were divorced, there
were life insurance policies on his life having a cash surrender value
of approximately $3600. All the premiums had been paid out of com-
munity funds. The court awarded to Mrs. Locke from her husband a
sum equal to one-half of the cash surrender value at the time of divorce.
It was conceded in the opinion that the wife had no right to control
the policies and that the court was without authority to compel the
husband to surrender the policies for cash. Nevertheless, the court
held that their cash surrender value was an asset acquired through the
payment of the premiums from community funds. The opinion dis-
98. The Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, August 29, 1947, p. 1, col. 1.
99. 143 S. W. 2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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cussed the nature of the cash surrender value of the policies and the
duty of the husband to account for it in the community settlement
in the following words:
"A cash surrender value of life insurance policy such as here
involved accumulates by reason of the payment of amounts in
excess of those required to provide the life insurance alone. In
the present case the cash surrender value of the policies was
acquired during marriage by purchase with community funds, and
not by 'gift, devise or descent'., At the time of the divorce, the
cash surrender value of the policies was property. Such property
clearly did not come within the classification of the separate prop-
erty of either spouse and therefore must be deemed to have been
property of the community estate of appellant and appellee...
This being so, appellant should account to appellee for the value
of her half interest in the cash surrender value of the policies." 100
The Supreme Court of Texas arrived at the same conclusion in
the case of Womack v. Womack,"01 where the sole question presented
to the court was whether the amount of the cash surrender value of
certain life insurance policies had to be accounted for as community
property. In that case, the husband and wife were divorced but the
divorce decree made no disposition of four policies on the life of the
husband under which his wife was named beneficiary and of one policy
on the wife's life under which the husband was named as beneficiary.
All of the premiums had been paid from community funds. Since the
divorce decree did not cover the dispogition of these policies, it was
proper under Texas law for a determination to be made in a separate
proceeding as to the rights of the parties based upon the cash surrender
value of the policies at the time of divorce. The court in the Womack
case directed the husband, because of the community property premium
payments, to pay to the former wife one-half of the difference between
the cash surrender value of the policies on his life and the cash sur-
render value of the policy on the wife's life. This case expressly
overruled Whiteselle v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. "02 The Whiteselle
case held that after divorce the husband was not liable to account to
his wife for any part of the cash value of a policy on his life, under
which he had (after naming his wife as beneficiary) paid the premiums
with community funds. In the Whiteselle case it had been held that
the payment of premiums from community funds did not give the wife
any community claim, even though the policy was on the record under
the control of the husband alone.
100. Id. at 638.
101. 141 Tex. 299, 172 S. W. 2d 307 (1943).
102. 221 S. W. 575 (Tex. App. 1920).
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A very recent Texas case on the subject is Volunteer State
Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin,1°' where the son, as heir of the wife, claimed
the right to share in the proceeds of two life insurance policies issued
on thelife of the father and payable to the father's sisters. During
the marriage all premiums had been paid from community funds, and
at her death before the insured's death the wife had been the primary
beneficiary of both policies. The husband had reserved the right to
change the beneficiary and after his wife's death exercised such right
by naming his sisters in place of his wife. The heir of the wife claimed
he was entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the policies because he
inherited one-half of the community estate from the wife (his mother),
or, alternatively, that he was entitled to recover one-half of the cash
surrender value of the two policies calculated as of the date of his
mother's death. The trial court held that the son was not entitled to
any part of the proceeds, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the
trial court and upheld the son's claim to one-half of the surrender
value existing on the date of his mother's death. In reversing the
intermediate court, the Texas Supreme Court, after pointing out that
there was no evidence of the husband's having defrauded his wife,
stated that it need not determine whether at the time of dissolution of
the marriage by the wife's death the son might have had a right to have
the cash surrender value of these policies taken into account in a parti-
tion of the community estate because he had failed to show both that he
had sought such a partition and that he had not received his full share
of such estate. By its decision in this case, the Supreme Court of
Texas does not appear to have limited the recently developed doctrine
that each spouse has the right to have the cash surrender value of life
insurance policies taken into account in a community property settle-
ment if the premiums have been paid with community funds.
This line of Texas cases does not affect the right of the husband
to surrender for its cash value a policy of which he is the record
owner, nor to take any other action consistent with his position as
manager of the community property. Of course, any right which the
wife might have with respect to the amount of the cash value before
surrender would thereafter exist with respect to the amount of cash
received by the husband from the surrender.
2. Right to borrow and to assign a policy for value. The
husband as record owner of the policy is able to borrow upon it or
assign it for value without obtaining the consent of his wife since he is
the manager of such policy, even though the premiums have been paid
out of community funds. In Pennsylvania it will (as pointed out
103. 197 S. W. 2d 105 (Tex. 1946).
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above) also be possible for the wife to be the manager of an insurance
policy which is a community asset. Section 4 of the Pennsylvania
Act makes her the manager of that part of the community property,
the title to which stands in her name. Therefore, where she is the
record owner of a policy she will be able to exercise the normal rights
accruing to the owner of an insurance policy, to the same extent that
her husband can when he is the owner.
3. Right to change beneficiary of the proceeds due at maturity.
It has been held in Texas that a husband is not deprived of the right
to change the beneficiary under a policy payable to his wife and insur-
ing his life when he has expressly reserved such right under the pro-
visions of the policy, even though the premiums have been paid out
of community funds.104
C. Conclusions Concerning Life Insurance
It cannot be stated with certainty what position will be taken by
the Pennsylvania courts in a particular situation relating to life insur-
ance policies. It is probable that the courts will rely heavily upon the
decisions of Texas because so many sections of the Pennsylvania Act
have been derived from the Texas Community Property Law. It is to
be hoped that the Pennsylvania courts will give appropriate weight to
the public policy considerations which require the enunciation of simple
rules that will permit insurance companies to act promptly on the
various requests that come to them from the owners of policies desiring
to exercise the usual life-time rights or from the beneficiaries whose
primary concern is to obtain prompt payment upon the death of the
insured.
[EDITORIAL NOTE: On November 26th 1947, in Willcox v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held the Pennsylvania Community Property Act unconsti-
tutional in its entirety. In view of the current interest in
community property in other jurisdictions, the Board of
Editors deemed it advisable to publish this second installment
by Messrs. Latta and Gemmill in order to present a more
complete discussion of community property problems.]
104. Ibid.
